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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS KILLER APP
Anupam Chander
INTRODUCTION
It’s not just Black Lives Matter. It’s #BlackLivesMatter. The
hashtag is silent.
The protests that swept the nation last year began through Facebook
and Twitter, organized via a hashtag. The hashtag allowed individuals who
did not know each other to learn, share, and debate, without requiring any
intermediation by the traditional media. The hashtag brought people to the
streets, and national attention to a problem as old as this country—the
differential treatment African-Americans can face in our justice system.
The Internet’s role in organizing protests is well understood. But it is
worth pausing to note that today, civic engagement increasingly occurs
online. Even if we are bowling alone, we’re doing so while sharing with
friends and family across the world—through Instagram, WeChat,
Periscope, Twitter, Weibo, and Facebook. Figure 1 below shows a map of
my own Twitter follower network, which literally stretches across the
globe. Even as we worry about a world in which people increasingly
withdraw into their mobile devices, where we are alone together,1 we
should recognize that individuals are connecting to each other in ways that
were impossible for the bulk of human history.
Figure 1:

While it is a commonplace that the Internet revolutionized speech,
what is perhaps less well understood is that free speech made today’s
Internet. “The First Amendment played an essential role in configuring the
1.

See generally Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from
Technology and Less from Each Other (2011); Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming
Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age (2015).
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legal environment that enabled the rise of the Internet as we know it today,
and in the process, helped bring the promise of 1789 closer to fruition.”2
This is the First Amendment/Cyberlaw Dialectic: the First Amendment
made today’s cyberlaw, and cyberlaw in turn helped make speech free.3
Some will say that speech was free long before the Internet. Didn’t we
teach courses about free speech prior to the rise of the Internet? Consider
the speech that was made free in the case that launched the modern First
Amendment, New York Times v. Sullivan.4 The speech in the case consisted
of an ad placed in the New York Times by civil rights activists. The
speakers paid $4,800 in 1960.5 That was the amount you needed in 1960 if
you wanted to reach a national audience, and could not get your message
delivered through the op-ed pages. Speech was hardly free (in cost), and
hardly equal (as in accessible regardless of one’s economic status). Indeed,
in his brief before the Court, Commissioner Sullivan ridiculed the New
York Times’ claim to be promoting the “equality of practical enjoyment of
the benefits” of free speech and press.6
When Governor Jeb Bush tweeted a photo of a gun engraved with his
name under the caption “America,” Americans responded.7 Many signaled
their approval with a heart. Many retweeted his tweet, though for many, a
retweet does not signal an endorsement. Yet others responded with
commentary. The cleverest ripostes found themselves repeated thousands
of times by strangers.
In recent years, we have seen many arguments for the signal success of
Silicon Valley. It was the confluence of money and education that led to a
successful agglomeration. It was the culture of Silicon Valley. Indeed,
many move to Silicon Valley from across the world to access venture
capital and local talent. It was the absence of enforceable non-compete
clauses. The traditional explanations are all incomplete. I will argue that it
was the First Amendment’s disciplining of private law that proved to be the
key feature of the success of American Internet enterprises.
As Raymond Ku has described in a highly influential article, the
Internet brought about radically different distribution mechanisms.8 But
rather than rely on individuals to put up web servers and web pages
themselves, the most successful distribution mechanisms were those that
created new social networks. These relied on information intermediaries,
creating what came to be known as Web 2.0.9
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Anupam Chander & Uyen Le, Free Speech, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 501, 505 (2014).
Id.
See generally New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 260.
Id. (noting that a full page advertisement cost $4,800).
See Jeb Bush (@JebBush), Twitter (Feb. 16, 2016, 1:27 PM),
https://twitter.com/JebBush/status/699706718419345408
See generally Raymond Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and
the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. Chi L. Rev. 263 (2002).
Id. at 301 (“content can now be disseminated to consumers without the need for
anyone other than consumers to invest in distribution”).
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Return to the traditional explanations for Silicon Valley’s success in
the Internet Age. Certainly, there is no better place to obtain venture capital
than Silicon Valley—but this reflects a history of success in prior
investments. Venture capital thrived in California because pouring money
into loss-making speculative enterprises run by twenty-somethings who
might be college dropouts proved successful time and time again.10 These
ventures depended not on large infrastructures, but on individuals across
the world contributing labor and content for free. And this in turn depended
on laws that made the ventures’ activities legal, specifically, insulated them
from civil liability for the wrongs of their users.
The culture of Silicon Valley prizes innovation and bold ideas that
carry the hubris of changing the world. Failure in a past venture is but
prelude to a future success. Again, this boldness in confronting the world
and nonchalance about failure arises through a recent history of success.
And again, that success would not have been possible without the law.
Finally, the talent pool in Silicon Valley is indeed hard to match
anywhere in the world. Walking into the cafeteria at Google is like entering
the United Nations. Silicon Valley became a magnet for talent from across
the world, again because of its earlier success.
If the companies had failed, venture capital and talent would have
dried up, and the culture shifted to one that was more risk averse.
The law provided the foundation for moving from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0
–from a world where everyone puts up her own website to a world where
intermediaries provide the platform that allows you to speak and to share.

I. MAKING CYBERSPACE A FREE SPEECH ZONE11
“Cyberlaw is today’s speech law. Yet, free speech casebooks and texts
pay little attention to the ways that cyberlaw configures the principal
mechanism for exercising free speech rights today—communication
online.”12
“The First Amendment protected Internet intermediaries from
obligations to censor, while at the same time rebuffing efforts to impose
stricter privacy obligations on Internet enterprises. The First Amendment
thus created the business model of new media, permitting it to publish vast
amounts of speech but not be held liable for that speech, while at the same
time earning income through advertising based on personal profiling. For
the first time, individuals could now speak to the nation—through
YouTube, Twitter, blogs, comments, Facebook, and Google—without

10. See generally Scott Shane, Why Venture Capital Deals Stay in Silicon Valley,
ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/252225.
(Nov. 2, 2015)
11. This Part draws in part from earlier work with Uyen Le. Anupam Chander & Uyen
P. Le, Free Speech, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 501 (2014).
12. Chander & Le, supra note 2.
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needing either princely sums for national advertising or the permission of
editors.”13
As we move from Web 2.0 to a Platform Economy, we should keep
some of these lessons in mind. After all, platforms such as Uber and
AirBnB are also search and communications engines, allowing individuals
to find and communicate with each other on a spot basis.

A. Section 230—Civil Wrongs
In passing the Communications Decency Act, Congress recognized the
Internet as “a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity.”14 The first of this series of statutes, the CDA, proved especially
valuable to the new breed of Silicon Valley enterprise. Section 230
established that no provider of an Internet service could be held liable for
content posted by its users.15 In short, the section largely immunized online
service providers from secondary liability for most torts committed through
their service.
This may seem quite elementary—but consider two alternative
approaches assayed in 1995.
In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., the New York trial
court promised that the market would compensate Prodigy for the increased
liability exposure.16 There is a simple economic logic to this, but it may be
that the costs of monitoring in a full liability context are so high as to
render the service too expensive to attract sufficient buyers.
A second alternative is more amusing. In the debates over the CDA,
Missouri Congresswoman Danner proposed:
Mr. Chairman, “… Telephone companies must inform
us as to whom our long distance calls are made. I believe
that if computer online services were to include itemized
billing, it would be a practical solution which would inform
parents as to what materials their children are accessing
on the Internet.”17
Zeran v. AOL, Writing for the court, Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson
III explained:

13. Id.
14. Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, H.R. 1978, 104th Cong. § 2
(1995) (enacted); see also 47 U.S.C.A. § 230.
15. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230.
16. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
17. 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. August 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Pat Danner)
(emphasis added).
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Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits
pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning
Internet medium. The imposition of tort liability on service
providers for the communications of others represented, for
Congress, simply another form of intrusive government
regulation of speech. 18

The core immunities in Section 230 are to be found in paragraph (c),
which carries the title, “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and
screening of offensive material.”19 One might have accordingly concluded
that such immunities were limited to websites that had acted as “good
Samaritans,” trying to clean up the Internet. As Danielle Citron observes:
The absence of self-screening was antithetical to
supporters of the Communications Decency Act, who
believed that controlling the volume of noxious material on
the Internet exceeded the capacity of public regulatory
agencies. 141 Cong. Rec. 22044-45 (1995) (remarks of
Rep. Cox). Supporters believed that reducing objectionable
material on the Internet depended upon ISPs acting as
Good Samaritans, voluntarily screening out as much
offensive content as possible. Given this history, courts
could have limited  § 230's application to intermediaries and
websites that engaged in good faith, though incomplete,
monitoring. Instead, they interpreted  § 230  as absolving
intermediaries and website operators of all responsibility
for users' actions, even those that knew about and ignored
indecent material.20

B. Copyright
“Introducing what would become title II,21 Senator John Ashcroft
declared that immunities against copyright liability would serve free
18.
19.
20.
21.

Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332–33 (4th Cir. 1997).
47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (c).
Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 61, 116 n.377 (2008).
The original versions of the DMCA introduced in the House, H.R. 2281, and the
Senate, S. 1121, on July 29, 1997, lacked any copyright liability limitation. See
WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaty Implementation Act
of 1997, S. 1121, 105th Cong. (1997); WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation
Act, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (as introduced by Rep. Howard Coble, July 29,
1997). Senator John Ashcroft introduced an alternative bill, S. 1146, on September
3, 1997, to amend the provisions of 17 U.S.C. by adding a new § 512 to provide
limitations on copyright liability for online service providers. See Digital
Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997, S. 1146, 105th
Cong. § 102(a) (1997). Representative Howard Coble introduced the House
version, H.R. 2180, on July 17, 1997. See On-Line Copyright Liability Limitation
Act, H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997). To reconcile the differences between the
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speech. He observed that online service providers could provide to “those
who use the Internet or information in a digital format for education,
entertainment, research” and that their—both the online service providers’
and users’—“opportunity to speak and to learn needs to be protected.”22 In
enacting title II, Congress defied the copyright industry, which believed
that the common law liability rule sufficed.
The House report explained that title II “essentially codifies the result
in the leading and most thoughtful judicial decision to date: Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communications Services, Inc.”23 In
that case, Judge Ronald Whyte of the Northern District of California
explicitly used First Amendment concerns to protect web services that had
been used for copyright infringement.24 The case exemplified the risk that
excessive copyright liability posed for speech. The copyright holders for
the works of Church of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard sued those
operating a Usenet bulletin board where a “former minister of Scientology
turned vocal critic” had posted portions of Hubbard’s works.25
When the House acted to adopt the conference report on October 12,
1998, Representative Barney Frank spoke of the impact of Congressional
action on free speech online: “We have in this country the freest speech in
the world,  .  .  . but we are developing a second line of law which says
electronically-transmitted speech is not as constitutionally protected. We
must reverse that trend or we will erode our own freedoms.”26
Representative Frank believed that title II ensured Internet intermediaries
would not act as censors: “In the Committee on the Judiciary, we worked
very hard in particular in trying to work out a formula that would protect
Senate and House bills, Representative Coble introduced H.R. 3209, which was
incorporated into H.R. 2281 (also introduced by Representative Coble), and
became part of title II. See On-Line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act, H.R. 3209, 105th Cong. (1998); see also Michelle A. Ravn, Navigating Terra
Incognita: Why the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was Needed to Chart the
Course of Online Service Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 755, 778–83 (1999). For a full legislative history, see S. REP. NO. 105190, at 2–8 (1998).
22. The Copyright Infringement Liability of Online and Internet Service Providers:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 42 (1997) (statement
of Sen. John Ashcroft). Any effort to address the copyright protection of material
on the Internet must protect everyone who stands to benefit from the expansion of
electronic commerce. The content community has to be highly regarded—and I
understand completely the need for the protection—but so do the online service
providers, and those who use the Internet or information in a digital format for
education, entertainment, research, and others. Their opportunity to speak and to
learn needs to be protected.
23. 144 Cong. Rec. E160 (daily ed. February 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Howard
Coble) (emphasis added).
24. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communications Services, Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
25. Id.
26. 144 CONG. REC. H10, 618 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Barney
Frank).
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intellectual property rights and not give the online service providers an
excessive incentive to censor.”27

C. Privacy
Even before the Internet, the First Amendment constrained the
common law privacy torts. William Prosser’s privacy torts had seen their
growth stunted by courts concerned about free speech.28 As James
Whitman writes, “Freedom of expression has been the most deadly enemy
of continental-style privacy in America.”29
Broad privacy mandates on Internet service providers faced the
possibility of First Amendment challenges—as in 1999 when the Court of
Appeals of the Tenth Circuit declared consumer privacy rules for
telecommunications providers unconstitutional. In U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC,
the appeals court ruled that requiring telephone companies to obtain
customer consent before using personal information outside certain
specified domains violated the companies’ First Amendment rights. The
court reasoned that the FCC could have considered an opt-out consent to
accomplish the statute’s purpose.
“[I]nformation is power,” Justice Kennedy declared, in his opinion for
the Court in 2011.30 In Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Supreme Court
dramatically demonstrated the seriousness of First Amendment constraints
on privacy regulations on information intermediaries.31 The Court struck
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 714 (N.C. 1988) (holding “that claims for
invasions of privacy by publication of true but ‘private’ facts are not cognizable at
law”); Renwick v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 412 (N.C. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984) (refusing to recognize the false light invasion of
privacy tort because it “would . . . add to the tension . . . between the First
Amendment and [privacy] torts”). The concern would continue into more recent
cases as well. Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1204 (Cal. 2007) (declining to
recognize an action of public disclosure of private facts because the investigation
and publication were “clearly activit[ies] in furtherance of [defendants’] exercise
of . . . free speech” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Denver Publ’g. Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 894 (Colo. 2002) (declining to
recognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy because it “raises the spectre of
a chilling effect on First Amendment freedoms”); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997
So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 2008) (refusing to recognize the tort of false light invasion
of privacy because it lacked “the attendant protections of the First Amendment”);
Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998) (declining to
adopt a false light tort because “claims under false light are similar to claims of
defamation, and to the extent that false light is more expansive than defamation,
tension between this tort and the First Amendment is increased”); Cain v. Hearst
Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. 1994) (declining to recognize the tort of false
light invasion of privacy).
29. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty,
113 Yale L.J., 1151, 1209 (2004).
30. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (quoting a Vermont
physician).
31. Id.
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down a Vermont privacy law that prevented pharmacies from sharing
physician prescription data for marketing purposes without physician
consent.32 Reasoning that marketing was a protected expressive purpose,
the Court held that the statute was a content-based restriction on protected
expression.33 The Court extolled the virtues of free information.34 Justice
Kennedy wrote, “Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the
speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct
human affairs.”35   This included anodyne details of prescription practices.
Because consumer privacy laws suppress the gathering, retention, or use of
typically mundane facts about individuals, the Court’s embrace of facts
suggests that broad consumer privacy laws would meet stiff First
Amendment challenge.”36
Low civil liabilities for the actions of users, combined with the ability
to create individualized profiles for targeted advertising, formed the legal
basis for the business model of the new Internet. This created the virtual
spaces for conversations and communities to form.

II. WHAT SPEECH HATH WROUGHT
I know full well that to speak rhapsodically about the Internet is to be
marked a fool. Consider this description from Jonathan Franzen of MIT
technology theorist Sherry Turkle (whom I also admire): “Sherry Turkle is
a singular voice in the discourse about technology. She’s a skeptic who was
once a believer … a grown-up.”37 The implication of this praise of the
technology skeptic is as follows: To be a believer is to be a foolish child.
To be a skeptic, is to be a grown-up.
Skeptics will point in particular to some of the negative aspects of a
free speech-focused Internet. In this part, I consider five critiques of our
speech-centered cyberlaw. While there are reasons for caution, I believe
that the social, economic, and political benefits of a speech-powered
Internet are substantial.

A. Criticism: Slacktivism
In 2014, the Oxford English Dictionary introduced its new word of the
year, slacktivism, defined as “support of a political or social cause but

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 2672.
Id. at 2671–72.
Id. At 2671-72.
Chander & Le, supra note 2.
Jonathen Franzen, Sherry Turkle’s ‘Reclaiming Conversation’, NEW YORK TIMES
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/books/review/jonathanfranzen-reviews-sherry-turkle-reclaiming-conversation.html?_r=0.
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regarded as requiring little time or involvement.”38 Evgeny Morozov
argues that Internet activism undermines more effective real world
activism: “When the marginal cost of joining yet another Facebook group
are low, we click ‘yes’ without even blinking, but the truth is that it may
distract us from helping the same cause in more productive ways.”39
Morozov considers such activism a distraction from more effective forms
of advocacy. Indeed, “slacktivism” is deployed most often to ridicule.
Morozov describes a Facebook group “saving the children of Africa,”
while boasting 1.2 million members, had only raised $6,000, or half-apenny per member.40 (The group is no longer active on Facebook so it is
difficult to evaluate it.) Slacktivism, under the skeptics’ account, reflects
yet another failing of the young generation: while my own generation and
the ones before worked hard for change, Millenials can only be moved to
press a button or at most add an emoji. (Emoji, as it turns out, was Oxford
English Dictionary’s word of the year for 2015.)41
As M.I. Franklin writes for the Oxford English Dictionary itself, the
term becomes an “easy dismissal of the way people use the Internet to call
to account power abuses at home and abroad, or to share information and
get organized by going online.”42 The reality is far more complex. As I
write elsewhere:

It would be foolish to believe that the circulation of a
graphic YouTube video of state sanctioned violence would,
by itself, lay a government low. Change comes from brave
people marching in the streets, sometimes risking arrest or
even their lives. But the videos and the tweets and the
online mobilization is increasingly the predicate for the
offline activity. That is what we saw in the Arab Spring in
2011—the circulation of information online that led to
massive protests organized seemingly from nowhere and by
no one.43 The violent and tragic death of Neda Agha-Soltan
in Iran spurred more people to take to the streets as the
video of her bloody body circulated online and via
cellphones.44 The fact that they did not immediately
overthrow the repressive regime should not lead us to
38. M.I. Franklin, Slacktivism, clicktivism, and "real" social change, OUP BLOG,
(Nov. 19, 2014), http://blog.oup.com/2014/11/slacktivism-clicktivism-real-socialchange/#sthash.T6da5ppy.dpuf/.
39. Evgeny Morozov, From Slacktivism to Activism, Foreign Policy, (Sept. 5, 2009),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/05/from-slacktivism-to-activism/.
40. Id.
41. Oxford Dictionaries Word of the Year 2015 is…, OxfordDictionaries Blog, (Nov.
16, 2015), http://blog.oxforddictionaries.com/2015/11/word-of-the-year-2015emoji/.
42. Franklin, supra note 34.
43. Chander, Jasmine Revolutions, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1505 (2012).
44. Nazila Fathi, In a Death Seen Around the World, a Symbol of Iranian Protests,
N.Y. Times, 22, 2009.
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conclude that the protests were useless. Of course, the
Internet helped organize protesters who did in fact
successfully bring down decades-old dictatorships in North
Africa.45

Not only are online activities often a prelude for real world change, but
they are often dangerous in and of themselves. According to the Committee
to Protect Journalists half of the journalists imprisoned for their reporting
across the world were reporting online.46 If Internet activism were
harmless, then why do repressive regimes seem to target Internet activism
with such frequency? I have argued that the proof of the value of Internet
activism can be found in the response of repressive regimes:
In case after case, authoritarian governments
threatened with rebellion have pulled the plug on the
Internet. In Burma, China, Egypt, Libya, and Syria,
governments faced with rebellion have shut off the Internet.
The Internet Democratization Skeptics might read those
governments’ shuttering of the Internet as proof that
Internet activists can be trivially defeated. Just pull the
plug, and voil`a, the activists can no longer foment trouble.
If the earlier Skeptics’ claim is that Internet activists can be
easily fooled, this claim is that they can be easily foiled. I
suggest that pulling the plug proves a different point:
authoritarian governments currently fear the Internet more
than they rely upon it.47
Indeed, countries often censor the Internet or even stall the deployment
of mobile Internet in order to restrict the possibilities of online activism and
information sharing. According to the Committee for the Protection of
Journalists, “[f]earing the spread of Arab Spring uprisings, Eritrea scrapped
plans in 2011 to provide mobile Internet for its citizens, limiting the
possibility of access to independent information.”48

B. Criticism: Merely Echo Chambers, Leading to Greater Polarization
Cass Sunstein and others have accused the Internet of narrowing the
media each of us consumes in a way that allows us to become further

45. Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People Is Greater than the People
in Power (2012).
46. See generally 2015 prison census: 199 journalists jailed worldwide, Committee to
Protect Jounalists,(Dec. 14, 2015), https://cpj.org/x/6691.
47. Chander, supra note 5, at 1509.
48. See generally Repressive nations threaten jail terms, restrict Internet to silence
press,
COMMITTEE
TO
PROTECT
JOURNALISTS
(2015),
https://www.cpj.org/2015/04/10-most-censored-countries.php.
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entrenched in our worldviews.49 While there is certainly some truth to this
observation,50 social science research is more equivocal as to whether this
is what is actually happening. Researchers at Facebook report that users’
see “cross-cutting” in their newsfeeds, and click on it with some
regularity:
While 22 percent of the content seen by liberals was
cross-cutting, we found that 20 percent of the content they
actually clicked on was cross-cutting (meaning people are 6
percent less likely to click on countervailing articles that
appeared in their News Feed, compared to the likelihood of
clicking on ideologically consistent articles that appeared in
their News Feed). Conservatives saw 33 percent of crosscutting content in News Feed but actually clicked on 29
percent (corresponding to a risk ratio of 17 percent).51

Equally important, the Internet must be compared to the media
available before the rise of the Internet. As I have written elsewhere:
What [the Internet as echo chamber view] neglects is
the fact that for many members of minority groups, the
shared experiences provided in the traditional mass media
consist largely in a portrayal of the majority group, and the
occasional, usually grossly distorted portrayal of the
minority. For minorities, then, the mass media generally
provides the “Daily Them”—a vision of society focused on
its dominant members. For minorities, this ubiquitous
vision of society confirms their status as marginal and their
concerns as irrelevant.52
The mainstream media valorizes a few voices, the voices of the
privileged and dominant in society. It reifies dominance. The Internet, on
the other hand, allows the development of smaller communities, where
people can find affirmation for their lives absent in the mainstream media.

49. See generally Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 (2007).
50. See generally Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER U.S. POLITICS AND POLICY, (June 12, 2014), http://www.peoplepress.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/.
51. Eytan Bakshy, Solomon Messing & Lada Adamic, Exposure to Diverse
Information on Facebook, RESEARCH AT FACEBOOK.COM (May 7, 2015),
https://research.facebook.com/blog/exposure-to-diverse-information-on-facebook/.
52. Chander, "Whose Republic?" (2002). Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers. Paper
12.
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C. Criticism: Manipulation Machine
Speech on the Internet is not free, many will argue; it comes at the
price of our privacy.53 There is indeed much truth in this. The business
model of much of the Internet is clear:
Web 2.0 providers earn money through advertising or
through selling additional services. If the online provider
can tailor advertisements precisely to the interests of the
user, then the advertising will be more lucrative. In other
words, the more the online provider knows about you, the
more it can earn.54
We need to assure that data is being used in ways that are appropriate;
that companies are not violating the promises they make to us to keep our
information private and secure.

D. Criticism: Hate Speech
The Internet has not only made it possible for people to organize and
inform, but also to deride and declaim. As Danielle Citron and Helen
Norton observe, “The internet facilitates anonymous and pseudonymous
discourse, which can just as easily accelerate destructive behavior as it can
fuel public discourse.”55
We need to find mechanisms to ameliorate the problems. Citron and
Norton argue for a more proactive, interventionist role among Internet
intermediaries: “Intermediaries can foster digital citizenship by inculcating
norms of respectful, vigorous engagement.”56 Google and Microsoft have
announced that they will de-index nude photos posted without the person’s
consent.57 Citron and Mary Anne Franks have also argued for more
vigorous engagement—by criminal prosecutors when the hate speech is a
cognizable criminal offense.58 California’s attorney general, Kamala
Harris, has launched a “war” on the particular scourge of revenge
pornography.59
53. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Manipulation paper.
54. Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 Emory L.J. 639 (2014).
55. Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech:  Fostering
Digital Citizenship  for the  Information Age, 91 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 1435, 1440
(2011).
56. Id. at 1447.
57. Eric March, If your nude photos are posted online without your permission,
Microsoft and Google want to know, UPWORTHY, (July 24, 2015),
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CONCLUSION

Let me return to where I began.
The zeitgeist of an age is perhaps more likely to be reflected on Twitter
than either the New York Times or CBS. The top ten news items trending
on Twitter in 2015 were as follows:60
1.  #jobs
2.  #Quran
3.  #ISIS
4.  #PrayForParis
5.  #LoveWins
6.  #CharlieHebdo
7.  #JeSuisCharlie
8.  #BlackLivesMatter
9.  #地震
10.  #SandraBland
These hashtags summarize the entire year in news. The hashtag serves
as a democratizer of speech, allowing anyone to have her thoughts
distributed for free around the world.
A First Amendment-powered cyberlaw made speech platforms like
Twitter possible. It configured an Internet of services that were paid
through advertising rather than fees, enabling individuals of modest means
to speak broadly to the world and to learn from the world in turn.
That is a result we should celebrate and also defend.

http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_28969241/californias-attorney-generallaunches-war-revenge-porn-and.
60. TWITTER, https://2015.twitter.com/top-trends.
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